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Abstract
As an increasing number of social networking data is published and shared for commercial and research purposes,
privacy issues about the individuals in social networks have become serious concerns. Vertex identification, which
identifies a particular user from a network based on background knowledge such as vertex degree, is one of the most
important problems that has been addressed. In reality, however, each individual in a social network is inclined to be
associated with not only a vertex identity but also a community identity, which can represent the personal privacy
information sensitive to the public, such as political party affiliation. This paper first addresses the new privacy issue,
referred to as community identification, by showing that the community identity of a victim can still be inferred
even though the social network is protected by existing anonymity schemes. For this problem, we then propose
the concept of structural diversity to provide the anonymity of the community identities. The k-Structural Diversity
Anonymization (k-SDA) is to ensure sufficient vertices with the same vertex degree in at least k communities in a
social network. We propose an Integer Programming formulation to find optimal solutions to k-SDA and also devise
scalable heuristics to solve large-scale instances of k-SDA from different perspectives. The performance studies on
real data sets from various perspectives demonstrate the practical utility of the proposed privacy scheme and our
anonymization approaches.
Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a social network, individuals are represented by vertices, and the social activities between individuals are
summarized by edges. In light of the recognition of the usefulness of information in social networking data for
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2Fig. 1. Privacy violation by degree attacks.
commercial and research purposes, more and more social networking data have been published and shared in recent
years. This, however, raises serious privacy concerns for the individuals whose personal information is contained
in social networking data.
Each individual in a social network is associated with a vertex identity, which can represent the user name or
Social Security number (SSN)1. Vertex identification, where malicious attackers utilize their background knowledge
to associate an individual with a specific vertex in published social networking data, is one of the most important
privacy issues that has emerged in recent year [24], [29]. Due to the complexity of social networks, the resistance
of vertex identification has been studied against different background knowledge from various perspectives [1],
[12], [17], [28], [30]. Backstrom et al. in [1] first showed that as long as an attacker knows a piece of information
about an individual, it is insufficient to protect privacy by only removing the vertex identities. Liu and Terzi in
[17] later proposed k-degree anonymity that guarantees the privacy protection against degree information. Given
the degree information, k-degree anonymity ensures that there are at least k vertices with the same degree in
a social network, such that the probability of an individual being associated with a specific vertex is limited
to 1/k. Similar concepts have also been applied to provide protection against attackers with stronger background
knowledge. The work in [28] considered the case where an attacker’s knowledge is the 1-neighborhood connectivity
around an individual and proposed k-neighborhood anonymity as a solution. The studies in [5], [30] introduced
k-automorphism anonymity and k-isomorphism anonymity against attacks of arbitrary subgraphs related to an
individual. Alternatively, a generalization technique is another approach. Hay et al. [12] were able to hide privacy
details about each individual by grouping a set of vertices into a super-vertex and inferring the relationships between
super-vertices from super-edges.
Note that, however, each individual in a social network is inclined to be associated with a community identity
[7], [14]. The community identity of a vertex can represent the personal privacy information sensitive to the public,
such as on-line political activity group, on-line disease support group information, or friend group association in
a social network. Different from the other vertex features such as gender or salary, community identity is a kind
of structural information that can be derived by the community detection techniques from a social network. The
existing vertex anonymity schemes thus cannot ensure the privacy protection for the community identities since it is
possible that the vertices with the same information known to an attacker gather closely in a subgraph (community)
of the whole social network.
Specifically, this paper addresses a new privacy issue, referred to as community identification, and shows that
k-degree anonymity is not sufficient. Consider the 2-degree anonymity in Figure 1 as an example. Suppose that
an attacker knows that John has 5 friends in this network. In the case of explicit communities, the attacker is able
to infer that John has AIDS since all vertices with degree 5 are associated with the AIDS community. Moreover,
even in another case of implicit communities (i.e., without explicit community label), the attacker can infer the
1SSN is a nine-digit number issued to U.S. citizens, permanent and temporary residents in the United States.
3neighborhood of John with only a distance one inaccuracy by identifying the dense subgraph in which John resides.
This example demonstrates that even though an attacker cannot precisely identify the vertex corresponding to an
individual, private and sensitive community information and neighborhood information can still be revealed.
To prevent community identification in published social networks by degree attacks, therefore, we propose k-
structural diversity, which ensures that for each vertex, there are other vertices with the same degree located in at
least k − 1 different communities. The rationale is that the probability for an attacker to associate a victim with
the correct community identity is limited to at most 1/k. We then formulate a new problem, k-Structural Diversity
Anonymization (k-SDA), which ensures the k-structural diversity with minimal semantic distortion. For k-SDA,
we propose an Integer Programming formulation to find optimal solutions for small instances. In addition, we
also devise scalable heuristics to solve large-scale instances of k-SDA with different perspectives. To demonstrate
the practical utility of the proposed privacy scheme and our anonymization approaches, various evaluations are
performed on real data sets. The experimental results show that the social networks anonymized by our approaches
can preserve much of the characteristics of the original networks.
II. RELATED WORK
Privacy is always a crucial factor in releasing or exchanging data. In the past decade, issues on privacy-preserving
data publishing (PPDP) on transaction data, such as record linkage, sensitive attribute linkage, and table linkage,
have attracted extensive research interest [9]. Record linkage refers to the identification of a record’s owner, and its
corresponding privacy model, k-anonymity [21], prevents record linkage by ensuring that at least k records share the
same quasi-identifier. That is, there are at least k records in a qid group. Following this initial research, a group of
studies, such as MultiRelational k-anonymity [20], extended k-anonymity to improve and support privacy protection
under various scenarios and attacks. In contrast to the record, the attribute value associated with each individual
is more important in sensitive attribute linkage, and l-diversity [18] ensures that at least l sensitive values appear
in every qid group. However, as Li et al. [15] observed, l-diversity is not sufficient to provide privacy protection,
especially when the overall distribution of the sensitive attribute is skewed. In other words, an attacker is able to
issue a skewness attack when a sensitive attribute is associated to a qid group with higher confidence than other qid
groups. This problem is remedied by t-Closeness [15] by demanding that the distribution of a sensitive attribute
in every qid group is similar to each other among the whole dataset. It is worth noting that both l-diversity and
t-closeness mainly focus on categorical sensitive attributes. For numerical sensitive attributes, a proximity attack
[16] identifies the interval in which the sensitive value s of an individual is located, while (ε,m)-anonymity is
proposed to ensure that the probability to infer an interval [s− ε, s+ ε] is limited to at most 1/m. Moreover, table
linkage is concerned about whether the record associated with an individual is presented in a released table, and
δ-presence [19] limits the probability of the above inference within a specified range.
With the explosive growth of information from social networking applications, privacy concerns in releasing social
networking data become increasingly important. Various issues, such as vertex identification and link identification,
have drawn extensive research interests [24], [29]. Vertex identification [1], [5], [12], [17], [28], [30] finds the one-
to-one correspondence of each individual and each vertex in a social network in order to extract sensitive personal
information, and many anonymization and generalization approaches for resisting vertex identification have been
introduced in Section I. This contrasts with link identification [5], [25], [26], [27], which discloses the sensitive
relationship between two individuals. To resolve this issue, perturbation [25] with edge addition, edge deletion,
and edge swap is proposed. To further address different privacy requirements, edges are classified into multiple
4types of sensitivities and removed with different priorities [27]. Zhang et al. [26] explored a new situation where
attackers possess the knowledge of vertex descriptions, such as degrees, and proposed to decrease the certainty on
the existence of an edge according to the attacker’s available knowledge. In addition, α-proximity [6] brings the
notion of attribute privacy in transaction data to social networks by extending the concept of t-closeness. That is,
α-proximity ensures that the distribution of labels in a neighborhood is similar to that in the whole social graph.
Different from all the above privacy models concentrating on varied datasets that are directly made public,
differential privacy [8] explores the condition on the release mechanism, i.e., a randomized algorithm A answering
queries to release information. Specifically, a randomized algorithmA follows ǫ-differential privacy if for all datasets
x and x′ that differ on at most one element, and any subset of outputs S ⊂ Range(A),
Pr[A(x) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ)Pr[A(x′) ∈ S],
where ǫ is a privacy parameter. Intuitively, the privacy protection increases with a smaller ǫ. Thus, differential
privacy aims to introduce noises into query results and provide robust privacy guarantee without any assumption on
the data and background knowledge possessed by an attacker. In the past few years, the great promise of differential
privacy has mainly been demonstrated on statistical database [9]. Very recently, a few studies [10], [11], [13] have
also proposed its application to social networks. To meet the privacy guarantee, those approaches focus on specific
data utility of social networks. Specifically, Hay et al. [11] proposed constrained inferences to provide provable
privacy for the degree distribution of a social network; Karwa et al. [13] studied the privacy-preserving problem for
subgraph counting queries, e.g., a triangle, k-star and k-triangle, while Gupta et al. [10] addressed the cut function
of a graph that answers the number of correspondences between any two sets of individuals.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we formulate a new anonymous problem, k-Structural Diversity Anonymization (k-SDA), to protect
the community identities of individuals in a network. The network is represented as an undirected simple graph
G(V,E,C), where V is the set of vertices corresponding to the individuals, E is the set of edges representing the
relationship between individuals, and C is the set of communities. These communities can be either explicitly given
as input or derived through clustering on the social network graph. Each vertex v has a community ID2, cv, in C,
and each edge in E can span two vertices in either the same or different communities. Let dv denote the degree of
vertex v, and k-SDA is also given a positive integer parameter k, 1 ≤ k ≤ |C|, to represent the structural diversity,
which is formally defined as follows.
Definition 1. A graph G(V,E,C) is k-structurally diverse, i.e., satisfying k-SDA, if for every vertex v ∈ V ,
there exist at least k communities such that each of the communities contains at least one vertex with the degree
identical to dv3.
2For simplicity, we focus on the one-community case in this paper while the multi-community scenario is studied in our ICDM paper [23].
3From the viewpoint of privacy protection, the concept of structural diversity proposed in this paper can be extended to support the multi-
community scenario [23]. For protecting a single community, the structural diversity anonymization (k-SDA) specifies that the vertices of the
same degree need to appear in at least k different communities. In contrast, to support the scenario that each individual belongs to a community
set with one or more than one community, the key factor for extending k-SDA is to ensure that the vertices of the same degree in the anonymized
graph appear in at least k different mutually exclusive community sets. For example, if two vertices A and B of the same degree in the anonymized
graph belong to community sets {C1} and {C2,C3}, respectively, those two vertices follow 2-SDA since the two community sets are mutually
exclusive. On the other hand, if A and B reside in community sets {C1} and {C1,C3}, respectively, it is easy for an attacker to infer that A
and B must participate in community C1.
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Fig. 2. Examples of two 2-structurally diverse graphs.
Fig. 3. Examples of limit of operation Adding Edge.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fig. 4. Examples of operation Splitting Vertex
In other words, for each vertex v, there must exist at least k − 1 other vertices located in at least k − 1 other
communities. Figure 2 shows an example with the graphs that are 2-structurally diverse, where the community ID
is indicated beside each vertex. In Figure 2(a), both communities contain a vertex with the degree as 1 and a vertex
with the degree as 2. Therefore, the graph is 2-structurally diverse. In Figure 2(b), two communities contain vertices
with the degree as 1, and three communities contain vertices with the degree as 2. For each degree, we can find at
least two communities containing vertices with the same degree. The graph is thus 2-structurally diverse.
Proposition 1. If G(V,E,C) is k-structurally diverse, then it also satisfies k-degree anonymity, which implies
that for every vertex, there exist at least k − 1 other vertices with the same degree.
Proposition 2. If G(V,E,C) is k1-structurally diverse, then it is also k2-structurally diverse for every k2, k2 ≤ k1.
The problem is to anonymize a graph G(V,E,C) such that the graph is k-structurally diverse. To limit the
semantic distortion in the corresponding applications, we define two operations, Adding Edge and Splitting Vertex.
Operation Adding Edge connects two vertices belonging to the same community. Adding an edge for two vertices
in different communities is prohibited because it may lead to improper distortion. For example, it is inappropriate to
artificially connect an individual in the liberal political action community to another individual in the anti-abortion
community to achieve k-structural diversity. Although operation Adding Edge alone can fulfill k-structural diversity
in some cases, k-structural diversity cannot often be solely achieved with this operation. Consider the example in
Figure 3. There is one vertex with the degree as 3 in community 2. However, by operation Adding Edge alone, it is
impossible to make any vertex in community 1 have a degree as 3 since there are only three vertices in community
1.
Therefore, operation Splitting Vertex is proposed to ensure that any arbitrary input instance can be anonymized
to achieve k-structural diversity. Each vertex v involved in this operation is split into multiple substitute vertices,
where each substitute vertex is a clone for the corresponding individual. Each clone represents the relationship of
at least one neighbor of v, such that all substitute vertices of v as a whole share the same relationships with the
neighbors of v before the splitting. Specifically, let Ev denote the set of incident edges of v, where v is replaced
6with a set Sv of substitute vertices such that (1) each substitute vertex is connected with at least one edge in Ev,
and (2) every edge in Ev is incident to a substitute vertex in Sv . Thus, Sv includes at most |Ev| vertices. Figures
4(b)-4(e) present several possible results for Splitting Vertex on vertex v of Figure 4(a). For the connectivity between
substitute vertices, a simple approach is to enforce that all substitute vertices of v must be mutually connected.
However, Splitting Vertex does not restrict that Sv must form a clique because an attacker can regard the clique
as a hint to identify the corresponding individual. Therefore, Splitting Vertex allows a substitute vertex to freely
connect to any other substitute vertex in Sv, and the flexibility inherited in Splitting Vertex enables our algorithm
to achieve k-structural diversity for any arbitrary input instance.
Note that in the previous study on the privacy preservation of databases [9], it was pointed out that maintaining
the original information stored in the database is important for some applications that are required to extract the
attribute values associated with the data tuples. For this reason, several database anonymization schemes [9], [15],
[18], [22] avoid removing a tuple or even any of its attribute values in order to preserve all corresponding information.
Similarly, for preserving the attribute values of a tuple to some extent, many existing anonymization schemes [15],
[18], [22] adopt generalization or suppression to hide a specific attribute value into its specific attribute range or
generalize the concepts of the attribute values, while the hiding ranges and generalization concepts are optimized
to reduce the distortion.
In this paper, the proposed algorithms with operations Adding Edge and Splitting Vertex can be regarded as
the above type of anonymization schemes that aims to preserve the attribute values to some extent. As such, the
information in the social networks is not removed by deleting or swapping the existing edges, even though the above
two strategies allow the proposed algorithms to be more flexible in anonymizing a graph. Nevertheless, the concept
of swapping an edge has been incorporated in our algorithm design. The proposed heuristics redirect an edge added
at the previous iteration, instead of always adding a new edge, in order to reduce the number of created edges.
However, redirecting added edges does not affect the original edges in the network, and hence does not violate our
objective of preserving the original edges in the network. Specifically, the objective of k-SDA is to minimize the
semantic distortion during the anonymization via Adding Edge and Splitting Vertex. We formally define k-SDA as
follows.
Problem k-SDA. Given a graph G(V,E,C) and an integer k, 1 ≤ k ≤ |C|, the problem is to anonymize G to
satisfy k-structural diversity with operations Adding Edge and Splitting Vertex such that na + ωns is minimized,
where na denotes the number of edges created in operation Adding Edge, ns denotes the number of vertices added
in operation Splitting Vertex, and ω is a positive weight for operation Splitting Vertex.
In this paper, we set ω as |V |2 (the maximum number of edges in a graph) to consider the case that operation
Splitting Vertex is performed only if the graph cannot be anonymized with operation Adding Edge alone.
IV. INTEGER PROGRAMMING
In the following, we propose the Integer Programming formulation for k-SDA. Our formulation together with
any commercial software for mathematical programming can find the optimal solutions, which can be used as the
benchmarks for the solutions obtained by any heuristic algorithm. We first derive the formulation for k-SDA with
only operation Adding Edge in Section IV-A to capture the intrinsic characteristics of this optimization problem and
to avoid initially including complicated details. Thereafter, we extend the formulation to incorporate both operations
in IV-B.
7TABLE I
THE INPUT OF k-SDA.
Notation Description
V the set of vertices
C the set of communities
E the set of the original edges
Ev the set of the original edges incident on v
v ∈ V , Ev ⊆ E
E the set of candidate edges that are allowed to
be added in operation Adding Edge
Ev the set of adding edge candidates incident on v,
v ∈ V , Ev ⊆ E
Sv the set of substitute vertices of v, v ∈ V
D the set of degrees, i.e., D = {d ∈ N |1 ≤ d ≤ |V |}
k the size of structural diversity
cu the community of vertex u, u ∈ V , cu ∈ C
TABLE II
THE DECISION VARIABLES OF k-SDA WITH OPERATION ADDING EDGE.
Notation Description
αu,v binary variable; αu,v = 1 if edge eu,v is added in
operation Adding Edge; otherwise, αu,v = 0,
eu,v ∈ Eu
δu,d binary variable; δu,d = 1 if the degree of u is d;
otherwise, δu,d = 0, u ∈ V , d ∈ D
θc,d binary variable; θc,d = 1 if there exists at least
one vertex in c with its degree as d; otherwise
θc,d = 0, c ∈ C, d ∈ D
A. Formulation with Adding Edge
As an initial basis, consider the formulation for k-SDA with only operation Adding Edge. Tables I and II
summarize the input and decision variables of k-SDA. In our formulation, eu,v and ev,u correspond to the same
edge. The objective function of k-SDA with only operation Adding Edge is formulated as
min
∑
eu,v∈E
αu,v.
The objective function minimizes the number of added edges. The problem has the following constraints,
∀u ∈ V, (1)∑
d∈D
δu,d = 1,
8∀u ∈ V, ∀d ∈ D, (2)
where d < |Eu| or d > |Eu|+
∣∣Eu∣∣ ,
δu,d = 0,
∀u ∈ V, (3)
|Eu|+
∑
eu,v∈Eu
αu,v =
∑
d∈D
dδu,d,
∀u ∈ V, ∀d ∈ D, (4)
δu,d ≤ θcu,d,
∀c ∈ C, ∀d ∈ D, (5)
θc,d ≤
∑
u∈V :cu=c
δu,d,
∀c ∈ C, ∀d ∈ D, (6)
(k − 1) θc,d ≤
∑
c∈C:c6=c
θc,d.
Constraint (1) ensures that the degree of each vertex is unique, and constraint (2) prunes unnecessary candidate
degrees for each vertex. The degree for each vertex u must be no smaller than the number of originally incident
edges. In addition, it cannot exceed the sum of the number of originally incident edges and the number of adding
edge candidates. The left-hand-side of constraint (3) represents the degree of vertex u, and constraint (1) guarantees
that δu,d is 1 for only a single d. In this way, constraint (3) together with constraint (1) ensure that binary variable
δu,d can find the correct degree of each vertex.
Constraints (4) and (5) collect the degrees of the vertices in each community. If the degree value of vertex u is
p, i.e., δu,p = 1, then constraint (4) states that the corresponding community must have at least one vertex with
the degree as p, i.e., θcu,p = 1. In contrast, for any other degree value q, q 6= p, constraints (1)-(3) ensure that
δu,q = 0 must hold. In this case, 0 ≤ θcu,q must be true when θcu,q is either 0 or 1. Note that this constraint does
not limit the value of θcu,d in this case. However, if the degree value of every vertex u in community c is not q,
i.e., δu,q = 0, then the right-hand-side of constraint (5) is 0 and thereby ensures that θc,d in the left-hand-side must
be 0. Therefore, constraints (4) and (5) ensure that binary variable θc,d can find and represent the degrees of the
vertices in each community.
Constraint (6) implements the k-structural diversity. Specifically, if community c has at least one vertex with the
degree d, i.e., θc,d = 1, then this constraint guarantees that there must exist at least k−1 other communities, where
each of them also has a vertex with the degree as d. In this case, for each community c with θc,d as 1, constraint
(5) will assign the degree of at least one vertex u in community c to be d, and constraint (3) will then add several
edges to u to fulfill the degree requirement. Therefore, constraint (6) is able to achieve the k-structural diversity in
k-SDA.
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THE DECISION VARIABLES OF k-SDA.
Notation Description
αu,v,i,j binary variable; αu,v,i,j = 1 if an edge is added
to connect substitute vertex i of u and j of v;
otherwise, αu,v,i,j = 0, u ∈ V , eu,v ∈ Eu,
i ∈ Su, j ∈ Sv
βu,i,j binary variable; βu,i,j = 1 if an edge is added
to connect the substitute vertices i and j of u;
otherwise, βu,i,j = 0, u ∈ V , i, j ∈ Su, i 6= j
ηu,v,i,j binary variable; ηu,v,i,j = 1 if the original edge
eu,v connects the substitute vertex i of u and j
of v; otherwise, ηu,v,i,j = 0, u ∈ V , eu,v ∈ Eu,
i ∈ Su, j ∈ Sv
piu,i binary variable; piu,i = 1 if the substitute
vertex i of u is active; otherwise, piu,i = 0,
u ∈ V , i ∈ Su
δu,i,d binary variable; δu,i,d = 1 if the degree of
substitute vertex i of u is d; otherwise,
δu,i,d = 0, u ∈ V , i ∈ Su, d ∈ D
θc,d binary variable; θc,d = 1 if there exists at
least one vertex in c with its degree as d,
c ∈ C, d ∈ D
B. Formulation with Splitting Vertex as well
We now extend the Integer Programming formulation in Section IV-A to consider both operations in k-SDA.
Table III shows the modified decision variables, where subscripts for substitute vertices are included in variables
αu,v,i,j and δu,i,d. To ensure that each substitute vertex in Sv has at least one incident edge in Ev , we incorporate
variable ηu,v,i,j to assign the edges in Ev to the substitute vertices, and βu,i,j represents the edges between substitute
vertices of v. Please note that we do not enforce that every substitute vertex in Sv must have an incident edge.
Instead, our formulation allows some vertices in Sv to have no incident edge. In this case, these vertices are not
actually split from v, and we regard these vertices inactive in Sv. In the extreme case, if only one vertex in Sv is
active and has incident edges, the vertex represents v in our formulation, and v is actually not split in k-SDA. In
our formulation, to avoid missing the globally optimal solutions, Sv has a sufficient number of candidate substitute
vertices, and only active substitute vertices are included or added to G in the solutions for users.
The objective function of k-SDA with both operations is as follows.
minω
(
− |V |+
∑
u∈V
∑
i∈Su
πu,i
)
+
∑
eu,v∈E
∑
i∈Su
∑
j∈Sv
αu,v,i,j +
∑
eu,v∈E
−1 + ∑
i∈Su
∑
j∈Sv
ηu,v,i,j
 .
The first part represents the cost from operation Splitting Vertex, and note that no cost is incurred if no such
operation is performed, i.e., there is only one active substitute vertex in Su for each u in V . The second and third
terms correspond to the cost from operation Adding Edge. Moreover, the edges between the substitute vertices of
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the same vertex, βu,i,j , induce no cost. The problem has the following constraints,
∀u ∈ V, ∀i ∈ Su, (7)∑
d∈D
δu,i,d = 1,
∀u ∈ V, ∀i ∈ Su, (8)∑
eu,v∈Eu
∑
j∈Sv
ηu,v,i,j +
∑
j∈Su:i6=j
βu,i,j +
∑
eu,v∈Eu
∑
j∈Sv
αu,v,i,j
=
∑
d∈D
dδu,i,d,
∀u ∈ V, ∀i ∈ Su, ∀d ∈ D, (9)
δu,i,d ≤ θcu,d,
∀c ∈ C, ∀d ∈ D, (10)
θc,d ≤
∑
u∈V :cu=c
∑
i∈Su
δu,i,d,
∀c ∈ C, ∀d ∈ D, (11)
(k − 1) θc,d ≤
∑
c∈C:c6=c
θc,d,
∀eu,v ∈ E, (12)∑
i∈Su
∑
j∈Sv
ηu,v,i,j ≥ 1,
∀u ∈ V, ∀eu,v ∈ Eu, ∀i ∈ Su, ∀j ∈ Sv, (13)
ηu,v,i,j ≤ πu,i,
∀u ∈ V, ∀eu,v ∈ Eu, ∀i ∈ Su, ∀j ∈ Sv, (14)
αu,v,i,j ≤ πu,i,
∀u ∈ V, i ∈ Su, ∀j ∈ Su, i 6= j, (15)
βu,i,j ≤ πu,i.
Constraints (7), (8), (9), (10), and (11) are similar to constraints (1), (3), (4), (5), and (6). The first term in constraint
(8) is different from the one in (3), in which every original edge in E is connected to vertex u. In contrast, here
we allow the edges in Eu to be distributed to the substitute vertices of u, while more edges are also allowed to be
added. The left-hand-side of (8) thereby finds the degree of each substitute vertex i of u.
Constraints (12)-(14) allocate the original edges in E to substitute vertices, add more edges, and identify the
corresponding active substitute vertices. Constraint (12) ensures that each original edge connecting vertices u and v
in k-SDA must connect a substitute vertex of u and a substitute vertex of v here, while new edges are also allowed
to be added. Constraints (13), (14), and (15) guarantee that a substitute vertex is active when the vertex has at least
one incident edge.
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V. SCALABLE APPROACHES
In this section, we solve the k-SDA problem on large scale social networks. Anonymization of large scale social
networks with minimal information distortion is always challenging because directly enumerating possible solutions
is computationally infeasible. Heuristically, anonymization problems can be solved by a one-step framework which
directly adjusts a graph to satisfy the privacy requirements [5], [28], [30], or by a two-step framework consisting
of degree sequence anonymization and graph re-construction subjected to anonymized degree sequence [17]. For
k-SDA, note that the degree sequence in the first step presents limited structural information due to the dimension
incurred from the community information, while deriving additional information in the first step is so computationally
intensive that an algorithm becomes less scalable. Therefore, in this paper, we design the algorithms to solve the
k-SDA problem based on the one-step framework.
To ensure good scalability and achieve the anonymization with minimal information distortion, we propose four
algorithms based on the following concepts. First, our algorithms anonymize the vertices one-by-one such that the
graph anonymization can be efficiently achieved with only one scan of the vertices. Second, to efficiently minimize
the total anonymization cost, we anonymize the vertices in orders of degrees and handle a set of vertices with similar
degrees to avoid searching for a large amount of combinations. Third, to consider the community information, we
propose two procedures, CREATION and MERGENCE, to anonymize each vertex v efficiently. Specifically, CREATION
forms a new anonymous group for protecting v, such that other similar vertices that have not been considered can
be anonymized via this new group and share the same degree with v. In addition to creating new anonymous groups
for anonymization, MERGENCE lets v join an existing anonymous group if joining the group only incurs a small
anonymization cost. Consequently, the above two procedures enable each vertex to be anonymized efficiently, and
the graph anonymization can thereby be achieved with minimal information distortion.
In this paper, we propose four algorithms to solve k-SDA. The first algorithm, named EdgeConnect, specially
aims at minimizing information distortion. That is, EdgeConnect applies operation Adding Edge alone since adding
edges within a community does not destroy existing semantic information, such as friendships, and makes limited
changes over the whole graph. It should be noted that, with sole use of Adding Edge, the degrees of vertices can
only increase. EdgeConnect thus considers the vertices in decreasing order of the degrees to first anonymize the
vertices with large degrees, so that we have more chances to achieve the anonymization of subsequent vertices
without affecting existing anonymous groups. Second, to provide more variety for anonymization, we then extend
EdgeConnect with operation Splitting Vertex and propose the CreateBySplit algorithm. CreateBySplit utilizes the
same anonymization flow as EdgeConnect, but leverages Splitting Vertex if the anonymization cannot be achieved by
Adding Edge alone. Incorporating Splitting Vertex can not only provide more chances to achieve the anonymization
but also incur less information distortion. Differing from the previous two algorithms, which focus on minimizing
the information distortion, the third algorithm, named MergeBySplit, is designed to guarantee the anonymization
for the social networks that are difficult to be anonymized with respect to a high privacy level k. For this purpose,
MergeBySplit anonymizes the vertices in increasing order of the degrees, and the creation of new anonymous groups
with small degrees thereby allows us to protect a vertex with any larger degree by operation Splitting Vertex. Finally,
we propose the fourth algorithm, named FlexSplit, to improve Algorithm MergeBySplit and reduce the number of
generated substitute vertices in the objective function of k-SDA. Specifically, in addition to anonymizing a vertex
by splitting it into members of the existing anonymous groups as in Algorithm MergeBySplit, FlexSplit is endowed
with a new splitting strategy, which splits a group of vertices to generate a new anonymous group of a target degree
for anonymization. With the capability of looking forward k subsequence vertices for anonymization, FlexSplit is
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able to reduce the substitute vertices with the two splitting strategies. FlexSplit is thus more flexible and preserves
more data utilities than MergeBySplit under the same guarantee of anonymization.
Before we introduce these algorithms in detail, we first define the anonymous group, which considers not only
the number of vertices of the same degree but also the distribution of the vertices over the communities.
Definition 2. An anonymous group of degree d, denoted as gd, consists of the vertices with degree d, i.e.,
gd = {v|dv = d}. A gd is a k-SDA group, denoted as ĝd, if Cgd = {cv|v ∈ gd} and the cardinality of Cgd is no
smaller than k, i.e., |Cgd | ≥ k.
Lemma 1. If every vertex v in G(V,E,C) belongs to a k-SDA group, G(V,E,C) must satisfy k-SDA.
Given a graph G(V,E,C), the objective is to assign every vertex v to a group ĝd with minimal information
distortion. In the next sections, we present the details of our algorithms.
A. Algorithm EdgeConnect
The EdgeConnect algorithm is designed for minimizing information distortion on large-scale graphs. For this
purpose, the EdgeConnect algorithm incorporates operation Adding Edge to anonymize the vertices one-by-one in
decreasing order of their degrees to avoid enumerating all possible combinations, which is computationally infeasible.
One merit of EdgeConnect is that the existing information is never removed, and the added local new edges within
each community incur few changes to the whole graph. Moreover, procedures CREATION and MERGENCE are
utilized in this algorithm, and any existing k-SDA group is never removed in order to avoid re-anonymizing the
vertices and increasing the computation cost. As a result, EdgeConnect has very good scalability, which is shown
in our experiments.
The rationale of Algorithm EdgeConnect is to adjust the vertex degrees one-by-one with operation Adding Edge
in order to let every vertex share the same degree with other vertices in at least k different communities. To avoid
examining all possibilities, the anonymization begins from a not-yet-anonymized vertex v of the largest degree, since
the power-law degree distribution demonstrated in the previous social network analysis indicates that each large
degree has fewer vertices required to be anonymized. For a chosen v, EdgeConnect utilizes procedure MERGENCE
and CREATION to explore the way to anonymize v with minimal number of new edges. Procedure MERGENCE aims
at adjusting the degree for a vertex v to join an existing k-SDA group, while CREATION is designed to collaborate
with other not-yet-anonymized vertices to generate a new k-SDA group with a new degree. In the example of Figure
5(a), the first vertex to be anonymized is vertex c because its degree is the largest one. At the beginning, procedure
MERGENCE is unable to anonymize c since no k-SDA group has been generated, and procedure CREATION thus
generates a new anonymous group of degree 5 by adding an edge connecting f and another vertex in the same
community, such as g. At this point, the new k-SDA group is {c, f} as shown in Figure 5(b). EdgeConnect repeats
the above process until all the vertices are successfully anonymized.
The details of each step are presented as follows. First, procedure MERGENCE protects a vertex v with an existing
k-SDA group gd. As all vertices in k-SDA group gd share the same degree d for structural diversity, the cost for
v to be anonymized (by the operation Adding Edge) in gd is
CostMRG(v, d) =
 d− dv, if d ≥ dv∞, otherwise. (16)
The minimal MERGENCE cost for v is evaluated as min
d̂
CostMRG(v, d̂) to find a suitable k-SDA group for v
from all existing k-SDA groups, where d̂ is the degree of a k-SDA group ĝd. For example, if there are three existing
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Fig. 5. Example of anonymization by EdgeConnect.
k-SDA groups with degrees 2, 5 and 6, the minimal MERGENCE cost for a vertex v of degree 4 is 1 by increasing
its degree to d̂ = 5. Next, for procedure CREATION, which introduces a new k-SDA group, our algorithm finds the
vertices distributed in other k − 1 communities to join this new group. Specifically, the diversity of a group gd is
first defined as
Div(gdv) =
 1, if |Cgdv | ≥ k∞, if |Cgdv | < k, (17)
where Cgdv = {cu|u ∈ gdv}. Accordingly, the minimal cost for v in CREATION is
CostCRT(v) = minU{Div(U)×
∑
u∈U CostMRG(u, dv)}, (18)
where U is any subset of k vertices that have not been anonymized, including v. For example, if k is 2 and not-yet-
anonymized vertices v and u in different communities are of degrees 4 and 2, respectively, when g4 has not been
previously generated, a simple way for anonymizing v is to create a new k-SDA group g4 = {v, u} by increasing
the degree of u to 4. However, to avoid exploring every possible U , we sort all not-yet-anonymized vertices of
each community in the decreasing order of their degrees, and the vertex with the largest degree in each community
is chosen for U since the degree difference between those vertices and v is the smallest. If |C| > k, only k of
the above vertices with the largest degrees are selected to construct U such that |U | = k. Therefore, finding the
anonymization costs for each vertex v is computationally efficient.
In our algorithm design, the not-yet-anonymized vertices in each community are sorted in the decreasing order
of their degrees. Let sc denote the order set of the vertices for community c, and sc(i) be the vertex with the i-th
largest degree in c. We anonymize the vertices one-by-one with MERGENCE and CREATION as follows. We first
choose the largest degree vertex v among s1(1), . . . , s|C|(1). If min d̂ CostMRG(v, d̂) is smaller than CostCRT(v),
procedure MERGENCE increases the degree of v by adding (d̂−dv) edges connecting v and the (d̂−dv) subsequent
vertices, which are not yet connected to v, in scv . We then update scv , and note that the update of scv is efficient
given that only (d̂ − dv) vertices increase their degrees by 1. Otherwise, procedure CREATION finds U , increases
the degree of each vertex u in U to dv in the same way, and updates the corresponding scu as well. We present
the proceeding illustrative example.
Example 1. Consider the graph in Figure 5(a) with k as 2. In the decreasing order of the degrees, the vertex
orders are s1 = cdabe and s2 = fgkhji. Accordingly, the first considered vertex (the largest degree vertex) is c.
From Formula (16), the MERGENCE cost for c is infinity as there is no 2-SDA group. According to Formula (18),
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the CREATION cost for c is 1, and the set U corresponding to the minimal cost consists of c and f (the first vertex
in sc). Therefore, vertex c is anonymized by CREATION and an edge is added between f and g. Consequently, a
new 2-SDA group of degree 5 is generated, and the vertex orders are updated to s1 = dabe and s2 = gkhji. Figure
5(b) shows the result after this iteration, where the anonymized vertices are shaded. 
The above two procedures can anonymize every vertex with a minimal cost at each iteration. However, Since
adding an edge increases the degrees of two vertices, the newly added edge (f ,g) in Figure 5 not only increases the
degree of vertex f for creating a 2-SDA group of degree 5 but also increases the degree of vertex g simultaneously.
Nevertheless, this increment of the degree on g incurs additional cost to anonymize the not-yet-anonymized vertex
g. To avoid the above case, we define redirectable edges and propose edge-redirection operation, so that edge (f ,g)
can be properly replaced by another edge, such as (f ,h), without revoking the anonymization of vertices c and f
examined previously.
Definition 3. An added edge (w, v), where w is an anonymized vertex and v is a not-yet-anonymized vertex in
the same community, is said redirectable away from v if there is another not-yet-anonymized vertex x in the same
community not yet connecting to w. Defined on such an edge, the edge-redirection operation performs
Ê ← Ê/(w, v) ∪ (w, x),
where Ê is the set of existing added edges.
Let Rv denote the set of edges that are redirectable away from v. The edge-redirection operation allows us to
reduce the degree of v without changing the degree of any vertex w that has been anonymized in a k-SDA group.
Therefore, we can modify procedure MERGENCE in the following way to allow v to join the group with a smaller
degree, by redirecting some added edges incident to v.
CostMRG(v, d) =

0, if dv ≥ d ≥ dv − |Rv|
d− dv, if d > dv
∞, otherwise.
(19)
Thus, to find a suitable k-SDA group, we derive the minimal MERGENCE cost for v as min
d̂
CostMRG(v, d̂),
where d̂ is the degree of a k-SDA group ĝd. Similarly, we modify procedure CREATION and derive the minimal
cost of creating a new k-SDA group for v as
CostCRT(v) = minU{Div(U)×
∑
u∈U CostMRG(u, dv − |Rv|)}, (20)
where U is any subset of k vertices that have not been anonymized, including v. As a result, with the edge-
redirection operation and the two modified procedures, we are able to reuse the edges added previously to further
reduce the anonymization cost.
In the following, we propose Algorithm EdgeConnect (Algorithm 1 in Figure 6) based on the modified MERGENCE
and CREATION. For each vertex v, EdgeConnect first finds the set Rv of added edges that can be redirected away
from v. More specifically, Rv is a subset of new edges incident to v added during operation Adding Edge. For
every edge (w, v) in Rv, there must exist a vertex x in the same community of v such that x shares no edge with
the anonymized w. To calculate Rv efficiently, Algorithm EdgeConnect examines every new edge (w, v) incident
to v to find VCv −Nw, where VCv is the set of not-yet-anonymized vertices in the same community of v, and Nw is
the set of neighboring vertices of w. We add (w, v) to Rv if VCv −Nw is not an empty set. For vertex g in Figure
5(b) following Example 1, (f, g) is in Rg since {g, h, i, j, k} − {g, i, j, k} 6= ∅. In Community 2, there is a vertex
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Fig. 6. The pseudo code of EdgeConnect.
h that does not connect to the anonymized vertex f . After identifying Rv, the costs induced from MERGENCE and
CREATION for v are evaluated by (19) and (20). If the MERGENCE cost is smaller than the CREATION cost, the
degree of v is increased by Adding Edge or decreased by the edge-redirection operation. Otherwise, EdgeConnect
anonymizes v by creating a new k-SDA group with the vertices in U that minimizes the cost in (20). EdgeConnect
returns the anonymized graph Ĝ(V,E ∪ Ê, C) and obtains the anonymization cost.
Example 2. We continue the example in Figure 5. However, procedures MERGENCE and CREATION utilize (19)
and (20) here, instead of (16) and (18) as in Example 1. In this case, c is still the first vertex to be anonymized.
However, at the next iteration as shown in Figure 5(b), without the edge-redirection operation, g can only be
anonymized by adding another edge to increase its degree to 5 (by MERGENCE), or by adding an edge between
d and e to create a new 2-SDA group of degree 4 (by CREATION). In both ways, we need to add an edge to the
graph. In contrast, the edge-redirection operation is able to avoid this additional edge. Specifically, for vertex g,
EdgeConnect first finds Rg = {(f, g)}. The CREATION cost for g is thus 0, and the set U that minimizes this cost
is {d, g}. The MERGENCE cost for g is 1 because the only 2-SDA group is of degree 5. Therefore, EdgeConnect
anonymizes g by creating a new 2-SDA group consisting of d and g, and redirecting the edge (f, g) to (f, h).
Consequently, the edge-redirection operation enables us to anonymize g with zero cost. Figure 5(c) shows the result
after the second iteration of anonymization, where the anonymized vertices belonging to the same 2-SDA groups
are shaded in the same color. When EdgeConnect terminates, the final anonymous result is shown in Figure 5(d).

B. Algorithm CreateBySplit
In this subsection, we extend Algorithm EdgeConnect with operation Splitting Vertex and propose Algorithm
CreateBySplit. Compared to EdgeConnect, CreateBySplit is a more realizable solution because Splitting Vertex
will increase the number of vertices in a community and provide a greater number of chances to achieve the
anonymization.
Specifically, Splitting Vertex replaces a vertex v with a set Sv of substitute vertices, and redistributes incident
edges of v to substitute vertices so that each substitute vertex presents partial truths of v. Splitting Vertex will
thus increase the number of vertices and incur higher information distortion than Adding Edge. To minimize the
information distortion, Splitting Vertex is always regarded as the second choice and will be applied only if Adding
Edge is not able to anonymize the social network.
In addition, to avoid creating too many vertices and increasing information distortion, we always use two substitute
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Fig. 7. The pseudo code of CreateBySplit.
Fig. 8. Example of splitting strategy of CreateBySplit.
vertices v1 and v2 to replace v, and connect v1 and v2 with an edge. This approach can limit the incrementation
of the length for the shortest path between any pair of vertices due to the split of a vertex.
In other words, when Adding Edge is not able to anonymize the social network (Algorithm 2 in Figure 7),
CreateBySplit anonymizes a given vertex v with Splitting Vertex in the following way. Let U denote the vertex
set consisting of k not-yet-anonymized vertices with the largest degrees in k different communities. CreateBySplit
generates a new k-SDA of degree d in the following steps, where d is the maximal degree satisfying d ≤ du for
every u ∈ U . When du > d > 2, CreateBySplit (1) replaces u with two substitute vertices u1 of degree du1 = d−1
and u2 of degree du2 = du − d + 1, and then (2) connects u1 and u2 with an additional edge (u1, u2), so that
du1 = d and du2 = du − d+ 2 eventually. In the 2nd step, the edge (u1, u2) is added not only to ensure du1 = d
but also reduce the information distortion such as the split of connected components and the impact in the shortest
paths (and their lengths). On the other hand, when du > d = 2, connecting u1 and u2 with an additional edge
(u1, u2) in the 2nd step will enforce du2 = du − 2 + 2 = du2 and thus make u2 just another u of the same degree
to be anonymized. Similar situation occurs for d = 1. To tackle those special cases with d ≤ 2, CreateBySplit
assigns du1 = d and du2 = du − d and no longer connects u1 and u2 with an additional edge. Consequently, in
both general and special cases, u1 will be anonymized in the newly generated k-SDA group of degree d, while u2
is a not-yet-anonymized vertex to be subsequently anonymized as with other vertices.
C. Algorithm MergeBySplit
Here, we propose Algorithm MergeBySplit for the social networks that are difficult to be anonymized with
respect to a high privacy level k. In CreateBySplit, even though Splitting Vertex can generate vertices to increase
the possibility of anonymization for the social networks, the algorithm still cannot guarantee finding the solution
of every instance of k-SDA. In contrast, MergeBySplit can anonymize every social network, even for the most
difficult one.
In more detail, MergeBySplit anonymizes the vertices one-by-one in the increasing order of the degrees, and
performs Splitting Vertex by allowing each vertex v to be split into more than two substitute vertices protected by
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Fig. 9. The pseudo code of MergeBySplit.
Fig. 10. Example of splitting strategy of MergeBySplit.
the existing k-SDA groups. The rationale of this algorithm is that, the creation of k-SDA groups with small degrees
allows us to protect any vertex v by splitting v into many cohorts of the generated k-SDA groups. In the worst
case, we can split a vertex v of degree dv into dv substitute vertices of degree 1 to achieve the anonymization for
an arbitrary k, 1 ≤ k ≤ |C|.
However, to reduce the information distortion, when we split a vertex v to cohorts of the existing k-SDA groups,
we create the least number of substitute vertices based on the following dynamic programming.
|Sv| = DP (dv)
= min{D(dv),min 1≤d<dvDP (dv − d) +D(d)},
(21)
where D(d) = 1, if there is a k-SDA group ĝd of degree d; otherwise, D(d) =∞.
We now describe the details of Algorithm MergeBySplit (Algorithm 3 in Figure 9). MergeBySplit sorts the not-yet-
anonymized vertices in each community in the increasing order of the degrees. Let sc denote the order set of vertices
in community c, and sc(i) be the vertex with the i-th smallest degree. At each iteration, we anonymize a vertex v
with the smallest degree dv with procedures MERGENCE or CREATION as specified in Algorithm CreateBySplit. If
it is too restrictive to anonymize v by Adding Edge and edge-redirection operations, we perform Splitting Vertex
operation to anonymize v. That is, we replace v with a set Sv of substitute vertices as shown in Figure V-C, i.e.,
V ← V/{v} ∪ Sv,
where the size of Sv is determined by Formula (21). Afterward, the edges incident to v are randomly redistributed
to the substitute vertices v1, v2, . . . , v|sv | such that each substitute vertex vj , j = 1, . . . , |sv|, is a cohort of some
existing k-SDA group ĝd, i.e., dvj = d. As shown above, anonymizing v by Splitting Vertex in this way can always
succeed. When all the vertices belong to k-SDA groups, Algorithm MergeBySplit returns the anonymized graph
Ĝ.
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D. Algorithm FlexSplit
In this subsection, we propose Algorithm FlexSplit that improves MergeBySplit and preserves more utilities of
the social networks under the same guarantee of anonymization. FlexSplit outperforms MergeBySplit by introducing
a new splitting strategy and the capability of looking forward.
To elaborate, in addition to splitting a vertex into substitutes protected by the existing anonymous groups as
MergeBySplit, FlexSplit is endowed with a new splitting strategy, which identifies a group of vertices and splits
these vertices to generate a new anonymous group of a target degree. In this way, the degrees of substitute vertices
are not constrained to be the same as those of the existing anonymous groups. FlexSplit is better able to preserve
the degree distribution by setting a large target degree for the newly generated anonymous group. Moreover, when
splitting a group of vertices together, FlexSplit introduces new edges to connect the substitute vertices to effectively
prevent the partitioning of connected components in a social network.
With Vertex Splitting operation, FlexSplit is thus more flexible and is able to anonymize a selected vertex v
in the following strategies, for reducing the number of generated substitute vertices. The first strategy is Single
Splitting, which splits v into multiple substitute vertices as in MergeBySplit. Let SMv denote the minimal set of
substitute vertices generated by Single Splitting, and SMv can be derived by Formula (21). The second strategy is
Group Splitting, which identifies a group of vertices and splits those vertices to generate a new anonymous group
of the target degree for anonymization. To create minimal number of substitute vertices, this strategy splits each
vertex into at most two substitute vertices. The minimal set SCv of substitute vertices generated by Group Splitting
is thus determined as
SCv = 2× {u|du > dv, u ∈W}, (22)
where W is the vertex set consisting of k not-yet-anonymized vertices with the smallest degrees in k different
communities. Since each node is split into two substitute nodes, we have a multiplier of 2 in Formula (22). One
of the substitute vertex is anonymized with the target degree dv of the newly generated anonymous group and the
other has the remaining degree du − dv + 2 with an additional edge added to connect the two substitute vertices.
Furthermore, FlexSplit is also endowed with the capability of looking forward, to reduce the number of generated
substitute vertices in the objective function of k-SDA. In other words, it should be noted that Single Splitting usually
generates fewer substitute vertices than Group Splitting, especially when k is large. If we simply compare |SCv | and
|SMv | and choose the strategy that introduces fewer substitute vertices to anonymize each selected vertex v, Single
Splitting will be performed most of the time for anonymizing v at each iteration, which may result in generating
more substitute vertices in total after many iterations.
To sidestep this trap, FlexSplit looks forward by identifying, from W , the subset X consisting of the vertices
that cannot be anonymized by Adding Edge alone, and compares the numbers of substitute vertices |SCv | and∑
u∈X |S
M
u |, instead of |SCv | and |SMv |, to choose the splitting strategy. Specifically, recall that the vertex set
involved in procedure CREATION is W , and X is the subset of vertices in W such that X cannot be anonymized
by Adding Edge alone in both CREATION and the subsequent MERGENCE. FlexSplit first examines every vertex of
W and initializes X as the set of vertices that cannot be anonymized by Adding Edge alone in CREATION. Let u′
denote the vertex of the largest degree among the vertices that cannot be anonymized in CREATION. X includes the
vertices in W whose degrees are smaller than or equal to du′ , since the CREATION process of these vertices will
also involve u′. Afterward, FlexSplit removes some vertices from X such that every remaining vertex in X cannot
be anonymized by Adding Edge alone in MERGENCE, neither. Let dmax denote the largest degree of the existing
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Fig. 11. The pseudo code of FlexSplit.
k-SDA groups. According to Formula (19), FlexSplit calculates the MERGENCE cost of every vertex u in X with
respect to dmax and removes u from X if CostMRG(u, dmax) > |Cu| − |Nu| − 1, where Cu denotes the set of all
vertices in the same community of u, and Nu represents all the neighbors of u. After that, FlexSplit compares the
numbers of substitute vertices |SCv | and
∑
u∈X |S
M
u |, and anonymizes v by Group Splitting if |SCv | <
∑
u∈X |S
M
u |
and by Single Splitting otherwise.
We now give the complete picture of Algorithm FlexSplit (Algorithm 4 in Figure 11). FlexSplit first sorts the
not-yet-anonymized vertices in each community in increasing order of the degrees. Thereafter, at each iteration, the
algorithm tries to anonymize a vertex v of the smallest degree dv with procedures MERGENCE and CREATION as
in MergeBySplit. If it is too restrictive to anonymize v by operations Adding Edge and edge-redirection, FlexSplit
discovers the set W of k not-yet-anonymized vertices with the smallest degrees among all communities, and
computes the minimal set of substitute vertices SCv required for Group Splitting. In addition, FlexSplit also discovers
the subset X of W and computes
∑
u∈X |S
M
u |, where each vertex u in X cannot be anonymized by Adding Edge.
If |SC | <
∑
u∈X |S
M
u |, FlexSplit anonymizes v by Group Splitting. Otherwise, Single Splitting is performed. When
all vertices belong to k-SDA groups, FlexSplit returns the anonymized graph Ĝ.
E. Complexity Analysis
We will now show that the complexities of the four heuristic algorithms. Let n, m and l denote the numbers
of vertices, edges and communities of the input graph G, and dmax represents the largest vertex degree in G,
dmax ≤ n.
We derive the space complexity of the four heuristics as follows. First, storing the whole input graph requires
O(n +m) space. For each of the four heuristics, maintaining a sorted list of not-yet-anonymized vertices in each
community according to their degrees during the anonymization process takes O(n) space due to each vertex being
involved in only one community. In addition, since operations Adding Edge and Splitting Vertex create new edges
and vertices during anonymization, to anonymize a vertex v, Adding Edge introduces at most dmax new edges to
protect v in a k-SDA group of the largest degree, while Splitting Vertex generates at most dmax substitute vertices
given |Ev| ≤ dmax. Consequently, the space complexity of the four heuristics is O(m+ ndmax).
After this, we can determine that the time complexity of each of the four heuristics is O(kn2 logn) in the
following manner. Firstly, EdgeConnect achieves the graph anonymization by processing the vertices one-by-one.
For each selected vertex v to be anonymized, the number of redirectable edges is bounded by the number of new
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edges incident to v, which is at most dmax. Finding the minimal MERGENCE cost for v involves a test of all generated
anonymous groups, which is bounded by O(n/k). Computing the minimal CREATION cost is O(l log l) since the
set U consists of k not-yet-anonymized vertices with the largest degrees from l communities. The adjustment of
v’s degree and the update of vertices’ order in a community can be achieved within O(n log n) time. As such,
MERGENCE and CREATION take O(n log n) and O(kn log n) time, respectively. The time complexity of anonymizing
v is then O(dmax + n/k + l log l + n logn + kn logn). Consequently, since l < n, the graph anonymization is
achieved in O(kn2 logn) time.
Second, with the Vertex Splitting operation, CreateBySplit can also anonymize a selected vertex v by generating
a new anonymous group of a smaller degree. The discovery of the k vertices with the largest degrees in different
communities costs O(l log l) time. The splitting of v, including the re-distribution of the incident edges to the
two substitute vertices is upper bounded by O(dmax). The update of the vertex order is O(n log n). Therefore,
the anonymization process of v takes O(kn log n) time. As an extension of EdgeConnect, the complexity of
CreateBySplit is thus O(kn2 logn).
Third, as with EdgeConnect, MergeBySplit achieves the anonymization of each selected vertex v in O(kn log n)
time by operation Adding Edge alone. By Vertex Splitting operation, MergeBySplit anonymizes a selected vertex
v in O(n log n) time because the minimal number of substitute vertices of v can be determined in O(n), and the
re-distribution of incident edges and the update of vertex order is upper bounded by O(n log n). Consequently, the
whole graph anonymization is achieved in O(kn2 logn) time.
Finally, by the operation Adding Edge alone, FlexSplit also anonymizes each selected vertex v in O(kn logn) as
the MergeBySplit algorithm. By operation Splitting Vertex, FlexSplit computes SCv in O(k) since there are k vertices
in W . To find X ⊆W , it takes O(kn) time to check whether the vertices in W can be anonymized by CREATION
and MERGENCE, because there are k vertices in W and for each vertex u, it scans O(n) subsequence vertices
in the same community of u to adjust the vertex degree of u. After finding X , FlexSplit calculates ∑u∈X |SMu |
in O(kn) as the minimal number of substitute vertices of every u in X can be determined in O(n) according to
Formula (21). Thereafter, FlexSplit chooses between Single Splitting and Group Splitting. Single Splitting takes
O(n log n) time as in MergeBySplit. Given W , Group Splitting splits the vertices in W in O(kn), and updates
the vertex order in the corresponding communities in O(kn log n). Consequently, the overall anonymization time
is bounded by O(kn2 logn).
VI. EXPERIMENTS
In this paper, we conduct the experiments on both real and synthetic data sets. All the social graphs are
pre-processed into simple graphs, i.e. unweighted undirected graphs without self-loops and multiple edges. The
community identities of the vertices are either known as background knowledge or derived by community detection
techniques4.
DBLP: From the DBLP data set, we select authors who have ever published their papers in the 20 top conferences,
such as AAAI, SIGIR, and ICDM. The selected data set consists of 30,749 authors, and there are 157,058 edges
representing the co-author relationships. As people usually publish their papers in the conferences related to their
interests, we regard the conference where an author published most of his papers as the community of the author.
ca-CondMat: This data set shows the scientific collaborations between authors of papers in the Condense Matter
category from January 1993 to April 2003. The graph is available at the SNAP (Stanford Network Analysis Package)
4METIS graph partition tool, http://glaros.dtc.umn.edu/gkhome/views/metis .
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web page, and consists of 23,133 vertices and 186,936 edges. An edge is built between two authors if they had co-
authored a paper in that period. Note that the community (conference) information for this data set is not provided
on the website. We then derive the community identifications by the METIS graph partition tool, as people in the
same social network group or cluster tend to interact more intensely, i.e., each group or cluster often forms a dense
subgraph.
AirPort: This graph is built by considering the 500 busiest US airports5. In the graph, there are 500 vertices
representing the airports and 2,980 edges between airports that have air travel connections. We also derive the
community identities by the METIS graph partition tool.
LesMis [2]: LesMis is a small pseudo social network that simulates the relationships between 77 characters in
Victor Hugo’s novel ”Les Miserables.” Two characters are linked by an edge if they appear in the same chapter.
There are 254 edges in total. The community information is derived by the METIS graph partition tool.
In addition, we also use R-MAT graph model [3] to generate synthetic data sets. R-MAT graph model takes four
parameters a, b, c and d, where a + b + c + d = 1, to generate graphs that match power-law degree distributions
and small-world properties, observed from many real social networks. In this paper, we use the default values of
0.45, 0.15, 0.15 and 0.25 for the four corresponding parameters, and generate graphs with the number of vertices
ranging from 20,000 to 100,000 for testing the scalability of our algorithms.
A. Privacy Violation in Real Social Networks
In this paper, we show that the structural diversity is a real privacy protection issue against degree attacks in
publishing social networks. The experiments are conducted on two real data sets, DBLP and ca-CondMat.
First, we study the problem of “whether many vertices of the same degree tend to gather in the same dense
subgraph (community)”. Note that if an attacker finds all the vertices of a particular degree appearing in a certain
subgraph (community), he can obtain the privacy information such as the neighborhood and connectivity properties
of a target. Privacy will thus be violated. Figures 12(a) and 12(b) show the percentages of vertices violating k-
structural diversity (k-SD), i.e., the anonymized group that does not spread over k communities, on the DBLP and
ca-CondMat data sets, respectively. Consider the DBLP data set with k set as 10. In both the original graph and the
20-degree anonymized graph, there are at least 2552 (8.3%) vertices violating 20-SD. As the value of k increases,
the number of vertices violating k-SD grows significantly. Figure 12 also shows that k-degree anonymity sometimes
makes this problem more serious, because k-degree anonymity is designed to minimize the additional edges and
does not aim to widely distribute the anonymous vertices of the same degree. This problem is even more serious
for the ca-Condmat data set.
Next, we study the problem of “what the degrees are of the vertices violating k-SD”. In this experiment, we
test the DBLP data set without anonymization and with 10-degree anonymization. Figure 13 shows the number
of communities containing vertices of a particular degree. Consider the case of 10-SD. The data points with the
community numbers smaller than 10 (below the horizontal dashed line) violate 10-SD. It is worth mentioning that
the vertices violating 10-SD have large degrees. This means that active people are more likely to have higher risks
of privacy violation.
In summary, the experimental results show that the structural diversity is a real privacy protection issue against
degree attacks, especially for the vertices of large degrees. Moreover, graphs protected by k-degree anonymity may
still violate k-SD as k-degree anonymity is not designed for the k-SDA problem.
5http://www.db.cs.cmu.edu/db-site/Datasets/graphData/
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Fig. 12. Vertices violating k structural diversity on (a) DBLP and (b) ca-CondMat data sets.
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Fig. 13. Vertices with the same degree over the number of communities in (a) original DBLP and (b) DBLP protected by 10-degree anonymity.
B. Anonymization Performance
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the EdgeConnect (EC), CreateBySplit (CBS), MergeBySplit
(MBS) and FlexSplit (FS) algorithms compared with the optimal solution, k-degree anonymity6, Algorithm Inverse
EdgeConnect (IEC)7 and SplittingOnly (Sonly)8.
1) Utility Studies: We now study the utility of anonymized graphs from the clustering coefficients (CC), av-
erage shortest path lengths between vertex pairs (ASPL), betweenness centralities (BC), degree centralities (DC),
eigenvector centrality correlations with respect to original graphs (EC-correlation), degree frequencies, the accuracy
of community detection and connected query results on the DBLP and ca-CondMat data sets. In all of the above
evaluations, we also compare our four heuristic algorithms with k-degree anonymity.
Clustering Coefficient (CC): Figures 14(a) and 15(a) show the clustering coefficients of the anonymized DBLP
and ca-CondMat as a function of k, respectively. The CC values of the original DBLP and ca-CondMat are about
0.781 and 0.706. It should be first pointed out that EC can almost perfectly preserve the clustering coefficient of the
original graphs on both data sets. This is because EC only adds new edges within communities for anonymization and
thus preserves many of the community structures. The trade-off, however, is that on ca-CondMat, EC anonymizes
the graph successfully only when k is (relatively) small. As an extension, CBS has a greater chance to achieve the
anonymization when k becomes larger, as is evident from Figure 15(a), while the cost is a small decrease in the CC
values due to the splitting of some vertices. To guarantee the anonymization, MBS does not connect the substitute
vertices of each split vertex and, therefore, weakens the cohesiveness of the communities especially when k grows
closer to the total number of communities in the graphs. Compared to MBS, FS has the CC values closer to the
original value as FS reduces the numbers of substitute vertices in the objective function of k-SDA. Finally, note
6We implement the Priority algorithm in [17].
7EC increases the degree of a vertex v from dv to d̂ by connecting v with not-yet-anonymized vertices of the largest degrees, while IEC
connects v and the last (d̂− dv ) vertices in the sequence with the smallest degrees.
8Sonly extracts only the capabilities of the flexible splitting strategy in FlexSplit and does not apply operation Adding Edge.
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Fig. 14. Performance evaluations on DBLP.
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Fig. 15. Performance evaluations on ca-CondMat.
that our four algorithms all outperform k-degree anonymity in preserving the community structures.
Average Shortest Path Lengths (ASPL): Figures 14(b) and 15(b) show the average shortest path lengths
between vertex pairs of the anonymized DBLP and ca-CondMat as a function of k, respectively. The ASPLs of the
original DBLP and ca-CondMat are about 6.4 and 5.36. EC monotonically decreases the ASPL values as k grows
because edges within communities are added for anonymization. CBS has better EC while the ASPL values neither
monotonically decrease nor increase. This is because CBS not only introduces new edges within communities but
also splits vertices and connects the substitute vertices of each split vertex. The cost of MBS for the guarantee of
anonymization is the increase of the ASPL values, as the substitute vertices do not directly connect to each other.
By reducing the numbers of substitute vertices, FS has the ASPL values closer to those of the original graph than
those of MBS. Finally, k-degree anonymity performs quite well on the DBLP data set, as depicted in Figure 14(b),
because k-degree anonymity provides less protection and requires only a few additional edges for anonymization.
On ca-CondMat, however, the proposed methods all perform better than k-degree anonymity. The reason for this
is that we consider the community structures and connect only the vertices in the neighborhoods.
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Betweenness Centrality (BC): Figures 14(c) and 15(c) show the betweenness centralities, i.e., the frequency of
a vertex on the shortest paths between pairs of vertices, of the anonymized DBLP and ca-CondMat as a function
of k, respectively. For similar reasons mentioned in the ASPL measurement, here we observe that the BC values
of the four proposed algorithms have similar trends (with respect to the original value) as the ASPL values, and
the proposed methods preserve BC better than the k-degree method.
Degree Centrality (DC): For a graph, a large degree centrality, which is usually used to measure the influential
vertices in social network analysis, indicates the existence of vertices with relatively large degrees. The DC
comparisons of the anonymized DBLP and ca-CondMat obtained by the proposed four methods and k-degree
anonymization are presented in Figures 14(d) and 15(d). The original DC values of DBLP and ca-CondMat are
0.00594 and 0.011713, respectively. On both data sets, EC, CBS and k-degree anonymization perform perfectly.
This indicates that the three methods can effectively preserve the strong leaders and influential vertices in the social
networks. In contrast, MBS and FS sacrifice the precision of DC in order to guarantee the anonymization. In other
words, anonymizing the vertices in increasing order of the degrees tends to make the vertices have similar small
degrees by the Splitting Vertex operation. Nonetheless, FS still outperforms MBS for many cases.
Eigenvector Centrality Correlation (EC-Correlation): Eigenvector centrality, another common measurement of
influential vertices in the social networks, estimates the influence of a vertex based on the influence of the vertices to
which the directed neighbors connect. Figures 14(e) and 15(e) show the EC-correlations of the anonymized DBLP
and ca-CondMat (with respect to the original graph). It can be seen that EC has the EC-correlations above 0.9 and
achieves the best preservation of influential vertices. The other three methods have the EC-correlations above 0.7
for most cases. Differing from the results in the DC measurement, here the four proposed methods all outperform
the k-degree anonymity, as a result of the structural information being taken into account in the anonymization.
Degree Frequency (DF): Figures 14(f) and 15(f) compare the degree distributions of anonymized DBLP and
ca-CondMat with the original graph, respectively. Although the distributions in small degrees are similar to the
original distributions, due to the different splitting strategies, CBS performs better than FS, and FS outperforms
MBS in preserving the distributions in large degrees.
Community Detection: Figures 14(g), 15(g), 16(g) and 17(g) present the accuracy of community detection on
the anonymized graphs with respect to the original DBLP, ca-CondMat, AirPort, and LesMis graphs, respectively.
The results indicate that all heuristics achieve comparable performance to the optimal solution (in Figures 16(g) and
17(g)) and k-degree anonymity (in Figures 14(g) and 15(g)), while the heuristics are able to provide stronger privacy
protection than k-degree anonymity. EC always outperforms k-degree anonymity on maintaining the community
structures, demonstrating that adding edges within a community can preserve semantic meanings. More interestingly,
EC slightly outperforms the optimal solution on AirPort in Figure 16(g). This may indicate that, in addition to the
number of new edges involved, the selection of the vertices to be connected and the vertices to be split is also
crucial for preserving communities in anonymized graphs. In Figure 15(g), the heuristics still outperform k-degree
anonymity in most cases when Splitting Vertex is incorporated. When a vertex can be split, the accuracy of all
heuristics is not lowered as k increases.
Connected Query: In addition to the measurements above, it is worth specifically mentioning that FS also
outperforms MBS in the capability of answering queries for pairs of vertices. For the ca-CondMat data set, about
0.01% to 0.03% (among two hundred million) pairs of connected vertices will be disconnected in the anonymization
process of MBS when k varies from 5 to 95, while none is disconnected by FS. This is because MBS does not
directly link the substitute vertices, and FS is able to reduce the numbers of substitute vertices with Group Splitting,
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which connects substitute vertices.
In light of the above evaluations, CreateBySplit outperforms EdgeConnect in guaranteeing the anonymization,
while FlexSplit can preserve the utility of a social network better than MergeBySplit. Therefore, we recommend
CreateBySplit for the cases of (relatively) small k and FlexSplit for more challenging cases.
2) Vertex Change and Edge Change: We now report on the three findings of (a) the percentage of the number of
new edges to the original number of edges, (b) the percentage of the number of vertices being split to the original
number of vertices, and (c) the average number of substitute vertices for a vertex split, of the anonymized graphs
as functions of k.
For DBLP, first, Figure 14(g) shows that when the value of k is smaller than 50% of the number of communities,
EC and CBS achieve the k-structural diversity by adding less than 5% new edges in the anonymized graph. Second,
the results in Figures 14(g) and 14(h) show that when k becomes larger, CBS tends to add new edges rather than to
split the vertices, while MBS and FS are prone to splitting vertices rather than to adding new edges. This difference
in tendency is caused by the reverse order of creating the anonymous groups of particular degrees, as we have more
chances to add new edges for the anonymization when the vertices are anonymized in the decreasing order of the
degrees. Third, Figures 14(h) and 14(i) show that MBS and FS use a similar number of substitute vertices for a
similar percentage of vertices that have been split. On DBLP, MBS and FS thus achieve comparable performances
for most k.
For ca-CondMat, the four algorithms have similar trends of adding edges and splitting vertices as those for
DBLP. However, Figure 15(h) shows that FS splits 1% to 2% fewer vertices than MBS under the same guarantee
of anonymization. Moreover, in Figure 15(i), FS uses more substitute vertices on average for a vertex that has been
split. This indicates that a vertex being split is likely to be a vertex with a large degree. The results also conform
to those described in Figure 15(f).
3) Comparison with Optimal Solution: Here we compare the heuristics with the Integer Programming method,
while the optimal solution is obtained with the proposed formulation using CPLEX9. Note that finding the optimal
solutions is very computationally intensive (e.g., for the AirPort dataset consisting of 500 vertices and 2,980 edges,
it takes at least one hour for the simplest instance and at least one day for more challenging instances). The optimal
solutions are not able to be returned within a reasonable time frame for large social networks, such as DBLP and
ca-CondMat. Therefore, the solutions from the proposed algorithms are compared with the optimal solutions of
AirPort and LesMis, with k from 2 to 4.
Figures 16(a)-16(g) and 17(a)-17(g) respectively present the data utility of the anonymized graphs of AirPort and
LesMis in terms of the clustering coefficients (CC), average shortest path lengths between vertex pairs (ASPL),
betweenness centralities (BC), degree centralities (DC), eigenvector centrality correlations with respect to the original
graphs (EC-correlation), degree frequency distributions, and community detection accuracy. It can be observed that
EC is close to the optimal solution in all evaluations but fails to anonymize LesMis when k is set as 3 and 4,
because EC applies only Adding Edge with edge-redirection to reduce the number of new edges. Moreover, for
AirPort with all k and LesMis with k = 2, CBS is very close to the optimal solution because CBS applies Splitting
Vertex only when Adding Edge alone cannot achieve the anonymization. In contrast, MBS and FS deviate from
the optimal solutions, because these heuristics apply Splitting Vertex and begin the anonymization from vertices of
small degrees in order to guarantee the success of anonymization for any instance. Here the results are consistent
9http://www-01.ibm.com/software/integration/optimization/cplex/.
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Fig. 16. Performance evaluations on AirPort.
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Fig. 17. Performance evaluations on LesMis.
with those obtained on the large social networks of DBLP and ca-CondMat.
4) Comparison of EC with IEC and Sonly: We compare EdgeConnect (EC) with Inverse EdgeConnect (IEC)
and SplittingOnly (Sonly) to explore the intuition beyond the design of Algorithm EdgeConnect and the extensions.
First, EC is compared with IEC on DBLP in Figure 14, ca-CondMat in Figure 15, and AirPort in Figure 1610.
Indeed, the results indicate that IEC outperforms EC in terms of the average shortest path length (ASPL) and
betweenness centrality (BC) (for the cases IEC returns a feasible solution, i.e., when k = 2, 4, 6 in Figure 14,
k = 5, 15, 25 in Figure 15, and k = 2, 3 in Figure 16), because EC takes as its priority choosing the vertices
with large degrees. As those vertices are more inclined to participate in the shortest paths of any two vertices, EC
reduces ASPL and BC in the anonymized graph. Therefore, IEC is suitable for the application scenarios in which
the characteristics of shortest paths are the major properties required to be preserved during anonymization.
On the other hand, the clustering coefficient (CC) of the anonymized graph from EC is closer to the CC value of
10The comparison is not performed on LesMis, because IEC is not able to return feasible solutions on LesMis.
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Fig. 18. Successful rates of heuristics.
the original graph, and EC is able to achieve better accuracy in community detection for most cases, as demonstrated
in Figures 14(g), 15(g) and 16(g). It is noteworthy that EC incurs fewer new edges than IEC in Figures 14(h), 15(h)
and 16(h), and generates a higher successful rate in anonymization, as seen in Figure 18. The reason is that a new
edge involved in the edge-redirection operation of EC has more opportunities to be reused in the anonymization
of other vertices considered later, as EC adds new edges between anonymizing vertex v and vertices of large
degrees prior to being anonymized. EC is thus more capable of handling the input instances that are difficult to be
anonymized by introducing only new edges.
The comparisons of EC and Sonly being conducted on DBLP are presented in Figure 14, on ca-CondMat in
Figure 15, on AirPort in Figure 16, and on LesMis in Figure 17. Whereas Sonly preserves ASPL and BC better
than EC in DBLP and ca-CondMat when k is small, for AirPort and LesMis, EC significantly outperforms Sonly.
This is because the degree differences between the vertices of the largest degree and the other vertices are more
significant in DBLP and ca-CondMat datasets, and EC is prone to connecting the vertices of large degrees to the
others, which thereby significantly shortens many of the shortest paths among the vertices. In contrast, for a small
k, Sonly only needs to split a few vertices of the largest degree to fulfill k-structural diversity. This results in the
lengths of the shortest paths increasing slightly. For the other parameters, such as CC, DC, EC-correlation, degree
frequency distribution, and community detection in most cases, the findings indicate that EC outperforms Sonly
because Splitting Vertex not only decreases the vertex degrees but also tends to change the community structure.
Nevertheless, as demonstrated in Figure 18, operation Splitting Vertex is necessary in our algorithm design for the
social graphs that are difficult to anonymize.
5) Anonymization Successful Rate: Here we compare the successful rates of the heuristics on DBLP, ca-CondMat,
AirPort and LesMis datasets. The results in Figure 18 show that MBS, FS, and Sonly are guaranteed to anonymize
any social graph thanks to operation Splitting Vertex. Those approaches begin the anonymization process from the
vertices of small degrees to generate anonymous groups. For this reason, the anonymous group of degree 1 will
be generated first, and Splitting Vertex can thus partition a vertex of any degree into multiple substitute vertices of
degree 1, even in the most challenging case in anonymization. In contrast, EC, CBS and IEC may not always be
able to anonymize a graph. The vertices of large degrees usually appear in the same community (e.g., a clique), and
not every community contains sufficient vertices of small degrees for anonymization. Therefore, when anonymous
groups of large degrees are generated prior to those of small degrees, the added new edges within a community
may significantly increase the degrees of the not-yet-anonymized vertices originally with small degrees, such that
it becomes difficult afterward to anonymize other vertices with small degrees. Compared with the other schemes,
the successful rate of IEC is smaller because IEC takes priority to add new edges connecting to the vertices with
small degrees, thereby further increasing the difficulty to anonymize those vertices.
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Fig. 19. Sensitivity studies given different numbers of communities.
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Fig. 20. Scalability of Algorithm (a) EdgeConnect, (b) CreateBySplit, (c) MergeBySplit and (d) FlexSplit.
6) Sensitivity: Consider the case that the communities are not given explicitly and, instead, community detection
techniques are used to obtain the community information for structural diversity. We then explore the sensitivities of
Algorithm EC, CBS, MBS and FS to the number of communities obtained by community detection techniques. In
these experiments, we conduct the analysis on DBLP as we know the ground truth of the communities in the data
set. Figure 19 presents the CC, ASPL, DC and EC-correlation, respectively, for |C| = 16, 20 and 24. Specifically,
EC and CBS show a little bit of sensitivity on the evaluation of ASPL because these two algorithms perform more
Adding Edge operations than Splitting Vertex, and as such will connect distant vertices in a large community, when
the number of detected communities is small. Nonetheless, the influence of the number of communities detected is
quite small for the four algorithms.
7) Scalability: We demonstrate the execution efficiency of our algorithms on synthetic data sets with the number
of vertices ranging from 20,000 to 100,000. The experimental environment is a Debian GNU/Linux server with
double dual-core 2.4 GHz Opteron processors and 4GB RAM. Although Figure 20 shows that the execution time
grows as the value of k increases, the proposed algorithms can anonymize the graph to satisfy k-structural diversity
in a linear-time scale of the graph size.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we addressed a new privacy issue, community identification, and formulated the k-Structural
Diversity Anonymization (k-SDA) problem to protect the community identity of each individual in published social
networks. For k-SDA, we proposed an Integer Programming formulation to find optimal solutions, and also devised
scalable heuristics. The experiments on real data sets demonstrated that our approaches can ensure the k-structural
diversity and preserve much of the characteristics of the original social networks.
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